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The Greek Cypriots made a clear choice to reject the Annan Plan for their country in a
r~ferendum in April 2004. The Annan Plan offered a dichotomous choice to the
electorate to accept or reject a federal solution to reunite Cyprus. In this paper, the
author investigates the Greek Cypriot population 's preferences for a solution to the
Cyprus Problem by peiforming multivariate analyses of data obtained from one
thousand Greek Cypriots.following the April 2004 referendum. The analyses.find that
preferences.for solutions are a.function of age and attitudes towards the ability of the
two communities to interact successfully. Younger Greek Cypriots tend to pr~fer some
form of separation while the older ones prefer some form of unification. Those who
feel that the communities can co-mingle tend to favor unification. R~fugee status,
socio-economic status, and educational levels appear to play little or no role in
shaping preferences for a solution.
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In April 2004, both the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot electorates
went to vote on a referendum to decide whether to accept or reject the Annan Plan,
a UN plan to unify Cyprus into one federal state. The Annan Plan is a proposal to
end the longstanding Cyprus Problem via the unification of the island into a federal
state with two equal constituent states, one Turkish Cypriot and one Greek Cypriot.
There are many controversial issues dealt with in the Annan Plan such as territorial
modifications to the current de facto states, the question of the return of refugees,
property provisions, the creation of a Reconciliation Commission, and the
demilitarization of the island.
The Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots in simultaneously held
referenda had a dichotomous choice on April 241\ 2004 and apparently had very
different views on the UN's plan. The majority (65%) of the Turkish Cypriots
voted to accept the Annan Plan. However, the majority (76%) of Greek Cypriots
voted to reject the Annan Plan. With the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan
Plan, it is back to the drawing board and a panoply of solutions, including
permanent separation.
The Cyprus Problem has a long history and has been dealt with in detail by
many (e.g., Attalides, 1979; O'Malley & Craig 1999). In brief, the current political
situation is a direct result of the 1974 coup by Greek Cypriot nationalists who
attempted to attain unification with Greece, in violation of the Republic's
independence agreement. Turkey replied to the coup with an invasion and
subsequent occupation of 37% of the island's landmass. Eventually, the areas of the
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island occupied by the Turkish military were declared the "Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus," a political entity that lacks international political recognition.
Two de facto states govern areas that are mostly ethnically cleansed. Nearly all
Turkish Cypriots live in the unrecognized state in the northern areas of the island
and nearly all Greek Cypriots live in the internationally recognized Republic of
Cyprus. There are a large number of refugees living in each part of the island.
Cyprus remains an island divided politically and ethnically under two de
facto states. With the resounding Greek Cypriot rejection of the UN's proposal for
unification of the island under a federal umbrella, there is need to learn about the
Greek Cypriots' desires for a solution. While Turkish Cypriots are generally
willing to embrace an offer that puts them in a federal situation with Greek
Cypriots, Greek Cypriots are not.
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots likely view the UN's proposal
differently because of their very different political and economic situations. Greek
Cypriots view a federation negatively because it implies recognition of a Turkish
Cypriot state. This is a contentious point among Greek Cypriots because they
frequently describe the Turkish Cypriot de facto state as "illegal." In addition,
Greek Cypriots know that they will be paying for much of the costs of unification
because they are the wealthier of the two ethnicities.
Turkish Cypriots generally desire unification because it puts them firmly
into the European Union without making the sacrifices to make it possible. This is a
definite plus for the Turkish Cypriots because, at present, they live in a gray zone in
which they are technically in the European Union, although they live under a
government that is unrecognized. In a federative set-up, Turkish Cypriots would
benefit from gaining implied recognition of their current de facto state. In addition,
Turkish Cypriots know that they will not be expected to pay for much of the
unification costs, because they do not have the means to do so.
But viewing the two major ethnic groups as monoliths lacks depth, since
both of the ethnic groups on the island of Cyprus may have segments with different
perspectives of unification on the island (Coufadakis, 2004, p. 77). Indeed, 24% of
the Greek Cypriot electorate voted in favor of the Annan Plan, illustrating that there
is not unanimity of opinion in Cyprus based upon ethnicity. The purpose of this
research is to delve into the political preferences of Greek Cypriots, since it is the
ethnicity that seems to be the major stumbling block to the international
community's best offer to assist in solving the Cyprus Problem. Much more must
be known about the preferences of Greek Cypriots, if future proposals by the
international community are to be developed. This research seeks to determine if
refugee status, age, socioeconomic status, opinions toward coexistence of the
communities, and educational background plays a role in conditioning Greek
Cypriot preferences for a solution to the Cyprus Problem.
This analysis is not an evaluation of the Annan Plan nor an analysis of the
problems encountered while marketing the Annan Plan to the Cypriots. Others have
dealt thoroughly in the issues brought up by the Annan Plan and the failure to
convince Greek Cypriots to embrace the UN proposal (see Coufadakis, 2004;
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Jakobsson-Hatay, 2004). Instead, this piece is an investigation of the demographic
and attitudinal attributes influencing Greek Cypriot preferences for a solution
typology. Such preferences are important to understand since the solution to the
Cyprus Problem may ultimately be placed in the hands of the electorate, as it was in
April 2004.
The Literature and Hypotheses
There is substantial literature written about Cyprus and its politics, much of
which is centered on how to solve the Cyprus Problem. Demetriou (2004) produced
an impressive work linking most of the academic articles dealing with the conflict
over Cyprus. In her analysis, the social science literature on the topic has developed
through three stages. The major stages of development of the literature, she argues,
went through an "early" period (1950-1974), a "positioned approach" period (19751990) and an "analytic plurality" period (1990-2003). She argues that early studies
of the politics of Cyprus dealt largely with the ethnic problems on the island,
including the different perspectives on the role of British administration of the
island. In the "positioned approaches" phase of the academic works, authors
generally deal with the ethnicities on the island and their positions vis-a-vis the
other major nationalities on the island. In this period, writers tended to write about
the positions of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots as groups with certain
interests and the external players in the Cyprus conflict (Greece, Turkey, Britain,
and the US) in much the same way. In the final period, the period of "analytical
plurality," the literature has showed a blossoming of the issues within the study of
the conflict over Cyprus but also an increasing plurality of approaches away from
the statist and realpolitik approaches in the earlier analyses.
What is especially notable about the research on Cyprus and the Cyprus
Problem is the overwhelming bulk of the writings on the topic deal with the
structural difficulties in solving the problem (see Hutchence & Georgiades, 1999;
Joseph, 1999; Joseph, 2000; Kyriakou, 2000; Peristianis, 1998; Richmond, 2001;
Theophanous, 1996; Theophanous, 2000). These structural approaches usually
entail illustrating which structural arrangements are necessary in order to make a
solution work or stress the role that external actors can play in solving the Cyprus
Problem. Out of analytical necessity, these approaches tend to view Greek Cypriot
and Turkish Cypriot positions as a monolith. Typical in these approaches is the
notion that Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots "want" or "need" a specific political
concession, something that Demetriou (2004, p.9-10) has pointed out.
It is understandable that the structural aspects of the Cyprus Problem since
the political aspects of the problem involve an internal and external dimension, as
Milne (2003) illustrates. He argues that the Cyprus Problem is complicated because
the island has to deal with an internal set of relationships while also dealing with a
related set of external relationships. The internal relationships are the questions
pertaining to making a situation in which the two major ethnic groups on the island
can live together peacefully and successfully, while the external relationships deal
with the external stakeholders in Cyprus (Turkey, Greece, the UK, the USA, the
UN, and the EU). With this complicated mix of stakeholders in the political
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situation in Cyprus, it is understandable that the literature tends to use what Allison
and Zelikov (1999) describe as a "classical" model. Indeed, the basic model,
viewing the conflict over Cyprus from a macro perspective can do a great deal in
terms of describing the political situation and making judgments regarding a
possible solution without having to go into detail about the standard operational
procedures of the organizations involved nor the particular perspectives of the
individuals involved in the conflict and negotiations for a settlement.
What is also notable in the literature is the role of external actors in solving
the Cyprus Problem. Many writings focus on the role of the UN or foreign powers
in creating or fixing the Cyprus Problem (see Attalides, 1979; Diez, 2002; O'Malley
& Craig, 1999; Richmond, 2002). Such approaches delve into how the problem was
created and suggest which international actors can play a role in helping to bring
about a solution. These approaches generally look into the causes of the split on the
island and do make suggestive remarks about the necessary pre-conditions for a
solution. The European Union and entry into the European Union for many, was
seen as a major catalyst for solution, although Richmond (2001) argues the
opposite.
Another segment of the literature concentrates on the role of nationalism
and underscores the competing nationalisms' influence on developing the current
problem and as impediments to a solution (Richmond, 1999; Stravrinides, 1975).
Although not void of the international dimensions of the ethnic conflict, such
approaches view the political problem on the island as a function of the ethnic
conflict, rather than the outcome of foreign influence. Such works generally view
the solution to the problem via communication across ethnic lines and confidencebuilding measures, while recognizing the positions of the nationalities on the island
have different needs from a solution.
Although the vast majority of the literature on the Cyprus Problem deals
with the macro political position of Cyprus, there is a substantial literature dealing
with questions pertaining to refugees (see for example, Hadjiyanni, 2001; Loizos,
1975; Loizos, 1977; Loizos, 1981; Zetter, 1994). This particular segment of the
literature is that it deals in-depth with the major issues of a part of the population in
Cyprus that has suffered directly from loss due to the invasion and the subsequent
political developments. A major thrust in the research is that refugee status is an
important point of a person's identity and is even transmitted to the young, as
Hadjiani (2001) points out. There are repeated references in the literature to the
desire of the refugees to return to their lands. This is especially understandable in
Cyprus, a country where land is seen as the most important way for investing for the
future (Zetter, 1994). Loss of land, for those who became refugees meant a loss of
investment that many are eager to get back.
The vast literature on the Cyprus Problem deals with macro issues of the
structure of a solution and the necessary international environment to make a
solution workable. However, few have delved deeply into the public opinion issues.
One notable exception to this is Broomc's (1998) essay in which he reported the
outcome of conflict resolution activities. In his essay, Broome (1998) explains
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many of the attitudinal aspects that were important for the project. Although not a
direct quantitative analysis of public opinion, the piece does look into the problems
of getting people from the two major ethnicities on the island to work together and
highlights the importance of political and social attitudes in terms of bringing
people together from the two sides of the dividing line.
In short, the literature pertaining to Cyprus and the Cyprus Problem is
highly limited. There is a substantial literature written about the Problem but there
are limited perspectives. The literature is filled with assessments and commentary
about the particular perspectives of the major ethnic groups on the island and the
perspectives of the international stakeholders but there is little in-depth analysis of
public opinion in the academic literature. No works have systematically tested
propositions about the preferences for a solution using a large dataset.
This . piece will attempt to fill in the need of the literature by rigorously
testing hypotheses to learn about Greek Cypriot perceptions of the acceptability of
various structural solutions to the Cyprus Problem. We seek to test the following
five hypotheses;
I. Refugees tend to prefer solutions that lead to unification of the island.
2. Younger Greek Cypriots prefer solutions that stress division of the island.
3. The higher social classes prefer solutions that stress division of the island.
4. More educated Greek Cypriots will favor continued division of the island.
5. Greek Cypriots who are more optimistic about interacting with Turkish
Cypriots will tend to favor solutions that stress unification of the island.
The literature has established that refugees are different from other citizens
due to their life experience. This life experience has also been passed down to those
who were born after the events of 1974. As a group, refugees have a strong
personal stake in some form of reunification. Many of the refugees hold land
claims and therefore are likely to receive financial rewards either by having their
lands returned to them or by payment in kind following a political solution on the
island. Land, as Zetter (1994) pointed out, is a major source of savings and
investment in Cypriot society. Refugees are unlikely to receive the economic
windfalls if the status quo is continued or if a formalized separation of the country
is agreed upon. Therefore, we expect refugees to be more in favor of solutions that
stress unification of the country.
We also expect major differences in preferences based upon age. We
expect that younger respondents will show a preference for continuation of the
status quo or a two state solution as younger respondents have lived under the status
quo and know no other situation and a two state solution is merely a de Jure
acknowledgement of the status quo political division of the island. This has been
brought up in explaining why the Annan Plan was rejected (Jakobsson-Hatay, 2004,
p. 5) but this may also reflect upon the basis of the solution. The young have grown
up in separation and to them it may not only seem a normal state, but also a
preferred state. For the older respondents, we expect that they would prefer
unification or a federal solution, as many of them grew up in an environment in
which there was not a political division of the island and wish to have the political
situation ante helium restored.
Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 12, Number 1
- 44 -

The Cyprus Problem and Greek Cypriot Preferences for a Solution after Their "No" to the Annan Plan

This work will also experiment with two other demographic attributes,
socioeconomic status and highest education received. Socioeconomic status is also
a suspected influence on preferences for a political solution. Socioeconomic status
indicates an individual's benefits from the economic and political status quo of a
society. We expect those respondents with a higher socioeconomic status to prefer
division, either in the form of a continuation of the status quo or a two state
solution, as they are the ones who benefit from the division of the island. Highest
education level achieved is also a consideration in the analysis as we expect that
those respondents with lower levels of education have been exposed to greater
amounts of nationalism and ideology and have not had the chance to experience
higher educational levels in which critical thought and reflection are more valued.
Finally, in this work, we will explore the notion that attitudes, and not just
demographic characteristics, play an important role, as Broome (1998) has pointed
out. Optimism regarding the ability of the two major ethnicities to peacefully live
side by side is a major hypothesized influence on preferences. This is not a
tautological relationship because the opinion toward the ability of the two major
ethnicities to interact does not imply a preferred political structure. Indeed,
ethnicities may be able to interact quite well under very different structural types.
Fieldwork and Data Collection
Several questions were asked to learn about Greek Cypriot public opinion
relating to rapprochement between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots following
the April 2004 Annan Plan referendum. CYMAR Market Research Ltd., a
respected market research company operating in Cyprus, was commissioned to do
the fieldwork and data processing for the study. The study was done as part of a
commercially available omnibus study, a study that is run on a regular basis by
market research companies, allowing for persons to purchase questions.
CYMAR conducted face-to-face interviews with respondents throughout
the Greek Cypriot areas of the island during May of 2004. The sample was
generally representative of the population of the island in terms of gender, region,
and urban/rural location. Random selection methods were used to find the
respondents. Interviewers arrived in neighborhoods in urban areas and villages in
rural areas and walked from door-to-door, using guidelines determined by CYMAR
to ensure as random a sample of the population in Greek Cyprus as possible.
Using omnibus services for such a study has strengths and weaknesses.
Because omnibus studies are shared studies, costs are minimized and this is
beneficial to the academic with limited resources available for research. In addition,
professionals organize, gather, and make the data machine readable, making it much
easier for the researcher to concentrate on and specialize in formulating the crucial
questions and analyzing the data. A weakness is that modification of the sample
used by the market research firm is not possible, since such modifications are not
feasible on a standardized product offered by a market research firm. As a result,
respondents in this study were only between the ages of 18 and 65, since older
respondents, apparently, are not interesting to most business customers.
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Dependent Variables: Preferences for a solution
There are several dependent variables for this analysis. Respondents were
asked, "What do you think the best permanent solution for the island is?"
Responses were pre-coded as "like now/status quo," "two separate states," "federal
solution," or "unification." Interviewers placed the open-ended response into the
category that best fit the respondent's response to the question. Around a third of
those interviewed reported that they preferred some sort of division-about 16%
said that they favored the status quo and 13% stated a preference for a two state
solution. However, the majority favored forms of unification-15% stated a
preference for a federal solution and 51 % said unification is best. The remaining
respondents did not have a preference, did not know, or refused to answer.
Because some of the responses are not mutually exclusive, there are some
problems of overlap. For example, unification does not necessarily exclude a
federal solution. Therefore, many responses have been dealt with by creating
dichotomous variables coded with a "1" for each response and a "O" for all other
responses. There are three different dichotomous variables signifying preference
for division with one denoting those who prefer a status quo solution, one denoting
those who prefer a two state solution and one denoting a preference for either a
status quo or two state solution. Likewise, there are three different dichotomous
variables indicating preference for unification with one denoting preference for a
federal solution, one for unification, and one for federation or unification.
It is arguable that the responses could be seen as part of a scale from status
quo to full unification. Therefore, a scale was used in which status quo responses
were codes as "l," two state solution "2," federation "3," and unification "4." The
higher scores indicate a higher level of desire for full unification of the island. One
scale was used in which there were four classifications, as mentioned above.
Another version of the scale was used in which the first two options were merged as
one, leaving a three point classification, assuming that there is commonality in the
first two possible preferences, division of the island.
Independent Variables
I Refugee Status
The refugees are denoted with a dummy variable with "l" representing
refugees and "O" representing non-refugees, according to their self-description.
About 39 percent of the respondents to the survey were refugees. We expect that
refugees will be more in favor of unification and a federal solution and opposed to
continuation of the status quo or a two state solution, as it is in unification, even
under a federal structure, that they are most likely to receive their lands back.
II. Age
Age is measured in years, according to respondents self-reporting. The
mean age of respondents to the survey was 44. We expect the young to favor
division and the older to favor reunification of some sort.
III. Socioeconomic Status
Socioeconomic status is classified on a scale of from A to E, with A being
the highest tier of the spectrum and D and E the lower tier. Interviewers classified
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respondents into the categories of A or B, C 1, C2, or D or E. Lower numbers
express higher socioeconomic status. Eleven percent of respondents were classified
as A-B and 18 percent were classified as C 1. About 48 percent were classified as
C2 and twenty-three percent were listed as D-E. We expect that the higher levels of
socioeconomic status will show a preference for division.
JV. Education
Highest education level achieved is based on self-description and coded as
"l" for those with a primary education, "2" for a secondary education and "3" for a
tertiary education. Twenty-four percent of respondents reported having a college or
university education while 59 percent reported a secondary education and seventeen
a primary education. We expect that those with less education will favor
unification.
V. Optimism of Coexistence
To measure degree of optmusm regarding the ability of the two
communities to coexist, respondents were asked a list of activities that indicated
interactions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. One of the activities
was living together in neighborhoods. Respondents were asked to indicate how
long it would take for the two groups to successfully and peacefully live together.
Possible responses were "never," "ten years or less," "five years of less," "three
years or less," and "one year or less." The responses reflect an optimism regarding
the ability of the two peoples to peacefully coexist. Higher numbers indicate
greater optimism. About one quarter of respondents indicated that they felt that
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots could live together peacefully and
successfully in neighborhoods in one year or less. The most pessimistic response
"never" was expressed by about twelve percent of respondents. We expect that the
more optimistic respondents will favor unification and a federal solution while the
more pessimistic respondents favor some form of division.
Statistical Tests and Findings
To analyze the data we ran a standard logistical regression with the
dichotomous dependent variables and the five independent variables and OLS
regressions on the two scales of unification. Logistic regression, a form of
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) procedure, was necessary to properly
analyze the data when the dependent variables were dichotomous. There were 988
respondents in the sample for the MLE tests, once incomplete responses had been
eliminated because of responses of "don't know" to the question of how long it
would take for Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots to live together as neighbors.
Only 938 cases remained for the OLS regression on the scale of unification
preferred, as responses of "don't know" and other responses that did not fit into the
pre-coded categories for the continuous dependent variable were removed.
The MLE models for dichotomous variables denoting preference for
division seems to work well at first glance, as the output in Table One shows. The
model is statistically significant with the three different variables denoting
preference for division, with a Chi-square that is significant at less than the .01
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In the models in Table 1, we see that only two of the independent variables
work as hypothesized and are statistically significant consistently-age and the
measure of optimism of coexistence. Socioeconomic status is only a statistically
meaningful factor in those who support the status quo. It appears that refugee status
and education play no role in forming opinions about different forms of division on
the island as a political solution. The findings illustrate that the younger
respondents are more likely to favor solutions that require division and that those
who are more pessimistic regarding the ability to live together in neighborhoods do
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the same.
The MLE models for federation and unification seem to work well, as the
output in Table 2 shows. The model is statistically significant, with a Chi-square
that is significant at less than the .01 significance level. All the constants are
statistically significant, illustrating the strength of the models. The R-squared
statistics arc very low, with the exception of the one grouping of the two solutions
that are part of unification. As with the model for division of the island, the model
with the two types of solution had been grouped together has the strongest
explanatory power, explaining about ten percent of the variation of the dependent
variable.
Table 2. Preferred Solutions: Federation/Unification
Logistic Regressions
(Significance Level)

Federal
Solution

Unification

Federal Solution
or Unification

B Coefficients

B Coefficients

B Coefficients

Variable
Refugee Status
Age
Socioeconomic Status
Coexistence Optimism
Education
Constant
Chi-square

.034
(.850)
.025***
(.001)
-.221
(.113)
.022
(.741 )
.104
(.612)
-2.480** *
(.007)
18.936***

Cox and Snell R Square
.019
Nagelkerke R Square
.033
988
N
*p<. 10, **p<.05, ***<.01 (I-tail)

.039
(.774)
.017***
(.001 )
.140
(.176)
.308***
(.000)
.015
(.922)
-2 .098***
(.002)
58.375***

.077
(.611 )
.038***
(.000)
.023
(.840)
.385***
(.000)
.113
(.500)
-2.368***
(.002)
125.686***

.057
.077
988

.095
.134
988

In the models in Table 2, we see that only one of the independent variables
worked as we had hypothesized and is statistically significant consistently-the one
denoting the age of the respondent. However, the measure of optimism regarding
coexistence of the communities is generally useful as an explanatory variable to
explain those who favor unification or preference for a federal solution or
unification. It appears that refugee status, education, and socioeconomic status play
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no role in forming opinions about different forms of unification of the island. In
general, older Greek Cypriots and those more optimistic about the ability of the
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to live together are more likely to prefer a
federal solution or unification.
When the continuous variables are used in an OLS equation, it appears that
much of the findings earlier are still true. Table 3 shows the outcome of the
regression using the same explanatory variables with a continuous dependent
variable. The models in Table 3 have a fairly low R-squared value, meaning that
the models only explain about ten percent of the variation. However, the predictors
of age and attitudes toward living together are statistically significant. It is the older
respondents who tend to prefer solutions involving some form of unification and
those who have a more optimistic attitude toward the ability of coexistence of the
ethnic groups who prefer some sort of unification.

tderal Solution
Unification

Table 3. Preferred Solutions: Continuous Variables
OLS Regression
(()!,S (:oefficients with T-ratios in J!,?!"~~tl1:~~~s)

Coefficients
4 Classifications

.077

l§ll2
.038***
(.000)
.023
(.840)
.385***
(.000)
.113
(.500)
-2.368***
(.002)
125.686***
.095
.134
988

Intercept
Refugee Status
Age
Socioeconomic Status
Coexistence Optimism
Education

R-sguared
Adjusted R-squared
N

3 Classifications

1.507***
(4.205)
.0374
(.528)
.01963***
(7.231)
-.005306
(-.097)
.203***
(7.761)
.005381
(.670)

1.011 ***
(3.626)
.0301
(.548)
.01369***
(6.483)
.002388
(.561 )
.156***
(7.678)
.005381
(.676)

.117
.112
938

.107
.102
938

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***<.01 (I-tail)
11dent variables
ently-the one
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In each of the eight regressions run, the independent variable indicating the
age of the respondent shows a systematic relationship with each of the dependent
variables showing preferences for a solution. In each case, the age of respondents
illustrates that younger Greek Cypriots prefer some form of division on the island,
whether a continuation of the status quo or the legal division of the island and do
not prefer federation nor unification. In seven of the eight regressions run, the
independent variable denoting the respondents' attitude toward interacting with
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Turkish Cypriots was successfully predictive. This illustrates that those Greek
Cypriots who have more favorable attitudes toward living with Turkish Cypriots are
more likely to favor unification or a federal solution. All the other independent
variables used in the analysis are almost complete failures in terms of explaining
Greek Cypriot preferences for a solution.
Conclusions
This systematic analysis has shown that age and attitudes towards
coexistence play an important role in determining a Greek Cypriot's perceptions of
the best solution for the Cyprus Problem. The younger Greek Cypriots show a
systematic preference for some sort of division while older ones prefer unification,
as Jakobsson-Hatay (2004, p. 5) has noted. It seems that the young Greek Cypriots,
who have grown up in partition and have never had to live side by side with Turkish
Cypriots do not see unification as desirable. This illustrates that the univariate
scanning of the data from the survey reflect something "real," even when
controlling for other factors. So it is of no surprise that 29 percent of 18-24 year
olds prefer a continuation of the status quo while only 6 percent of those over 55 do
the same.
Those who are optimistic about coexistence tend to prefer some sort of
unification while those who are more pessimistic prefer some form of division.
This would not be surprising to those who have worked within the field of conflict
resolution. Indeed, Broome (1998) indicates that attitudes toward being able to
work together are necessary in order for the two communities to move forward.
What is most interesting about the findings is that refugee status plays no
role in forming preferences for a solution. This is especially surprising because
refugees are people with direct material interests in unification and risk losing out
on material benefits if the status quo continues. It seems that the investment in
land, as Zetter (1994) argues is very important in Cypriot society is not so important
that it will sway a person's political opinion regarding the desirability of a particular
form of solution. This is especially surprising given that even the refugees, who
Hadjiyanni (2001) describes as people who continue to suffer from their losses, do
not support forms of a solution that will likely profit them directly.
A crucial finding from the study is that attitudes toward the other are a
powerful determinant of preferences. From an analyst's perspective, this brings up
some difficulties because it is often easier to look for demographic variables to
explain preferences rather than attitudes that may be the function of life
experiences. Future research should look into how optimism toward interacting
with people from the other community develops as it seems that learning about how
optimism regarding interacting with Turkish Cypriots plays a major role in forming
preferences for a political solution.
One reasonable criticism of the findings would be that the survey took place
during a very important and "political" time in Cypriot history. The fieldwork took
place less than a month after the referendum on the Annan Plan, during the same
month as entry into the EU, and a few weeks prior to the elections for the European
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Parliament. Future research should be done to determine whether responses in the
month following the referendum were the result of strongly-held preferences for a
solution or if such preferences had been radically shaped by the political rhetoric
surrounding the referendum on the Annan Plan, the country's entry into the EU, and
the elections for the parliament in Brussels.
For those interested in solving the Cyprus Problem, the study highlights the
importance of engaging the Greek Cypriot youth. If a solution is to come about, the
younger Greek Cypriots who have grown up in separation from Turkish Cypriots
will have to be shown why it is in their benefit to live in a shared state with Turkish
Cypriots. This should be a difficult feat since separation of the major ethnicities is
correlated with the economic take-off of Greek Cyprus. In addition, it will be
difficult to convince young Greek Cypriots that federation or unification really is in
their interests since they know they will have to pay for the costs of reconstruction
disproportionately and may not feel obliged to do so.
However, the findings also suggest that there is hope for unifying Cyprus.
Since Greek Cypriot attitudes toward interacting with Turkish Cypriots are a major
influence on the preferences for a solution, creating more favorable opinions will
encourage greater support for unification. There is indication that changing
attitudes is possible, generally by fostering greater contacts between individuals of
the two communities. The research has shown that there is indication that increased
contacts between individuals has fostered an increased optimism regarding the
ability of the two communities to coexist (Yildizian & Ehteshami, 2004, p. 11 ). The
diplomatic community can make a significant contribution to creating the necessary
preconditions to a solution, since diplomatic support for such activities has had
some successes (Broome 1998, p. 61-62).
This analysis has shed some light on an interesting and current topic in
Cyprus at a crucial point in time. Future research should look into finding other
attributes that help to shape a person's political view of the best possible solution to
the Cyprus Problem. Future research should also give respondents a way of
expressing variations on unification such as offering them a choice of a federal
government with a weak central government or a strong one. The future, for
Cyprus, is unwritten and filled with opportunities for many different forms of
structure to unify the country or divide the country. However, it appears that time is
an element that is not on the side of unification as the generations that have grown
up in a divided Cyprus show a preference for a continuation of division.
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